The System Nature

In the nature, the intelligent and conscientious activity progresses until the plans highest, until its intelligence reach autoconscincia (Absolute Idealismo being that this only can be found and be debated by the intermediary of the freedom). Schelling makes aluso to the inverse way (of intelligence for the nature, therefore the heading of its workmanship ' ' The System of the Idealismo Transcendental' '). In reply to the question: ' ' of that way, at the same time, the representations can be thought as determined for objects and objects they can be thought as determined for the representations? ' ' , Explicit Schelling that this is not the first task of the Philosophy more yes the supreme task of the Transcendental Philosophy, and only comes the light such reply to this question if to combine both the worlds (I and Not-I). A priori, in an objective world this vision is inalcanvel alone will become possible will have a preset world, being that, this last one could only be thought assuming that the activities of this last world between both were identical to the objective world and vice versa. All free action produces something, exactly that conscientiously searching such production. Let us assume that all principle of this produced conscientious action also has an unconscious principle (conscientious not-conscientious).

Also let us assume that she is this the basic identity of the first one. In the action of the fondness what it was shown as activity of the first one must necessarily coexist also in the plan of second, among others words, what it exists in the conscientious plan must coexist in the not-conscientious one. The nature, as much in all how much in parts it must be treated as a work the effect, exactly being this deriving one of the mecanicismo, that is, the philosophy of the nature can be understood as it being a teleologic philosophy (possessing, therefore a purpose), for if to worry in the ends where the same one results and it only would be complete if she could demonstrate this identity in its principle, in I.